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ABSTRACT
The manner in which the 100 billion or so neurons in the human brain work together 
to give us the rich subjective reality of conscious experience has been referred to as 
the “hard question”.  This paper seeks to explore this question: exposing some of 
its difficult dimensions as well as noting and critiquing various attempts to probe 
and explain its mysteries.  The views of some prominent Christian scholars, such 
as Donald McKay and Charles Taliaferro, conclude this analysis.
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INTRODUCTION
Before I launch into the deep water 
surrounding my chosen topic, I believe 
it would be of value for me to explain 
something of my academic back-
ground and why I have an interest in 
this topic.  During the first few years of 
my working life as a secondary school 
science teacher I attended Auckland 
University after school most evenings 
to study psychology part time.  Lec-
tures were usually informative and 
interesting but for the most part I was 
uncomfortable with the philosophical 
orientation of the department and the 
course.  This was the early sixties and 
B F Skinner’s brand of behaviouristic 
psychology was embraced by the 
Department.  I had hoped to explore 
the dynamics of human behaviour but 
instead spent most of my time studying 
the hooded rat.  My very first labora-
tory experiment involved the operant 
conditioning of a rat in a Skinner box. 
I have vivid memories of one occa-
sion when fellow students assisted a 
reluctant rat on its journey through a 
T-maze with a meter rule late in the 
evening in order to clear the lab and 
let the caretaker shut up for the night.
But why rats?  Skinner‘s brand of psy-
chology operated on the assumption 
that observed behaviour rather than 
internal human states provided the 
only acceptable data for psychology. 
In adopting a rigorously experimen-
tal approach to the discipline and a 
naturalistic world-view, Skinner, my 
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5Department and the vast majority of 
psychologists at that time were simply 
trying to be good scientists.  Nobel 
Laureate Roger Sperry (1987) put 
it this way: “As a brain researcher, 
I’d started out simply accepting the 
strictly objective principles of the be-
haviourist position.  In the 1950’s and 
early 1960’s, all respectable neurosci-
entists thought in these terms. In those 
days we wouldn’t have been caught 
dead implying that consciousness or 
subjective experience can affect brain 
processing”. The assumptions of a 
naturalistic world-view were logically 
extended to the belief that humans are 
nothing but matter and that the human 
mind is a by-product of functioning 
matter.  And if matter is ruled by cause 
and effect relationships then humans, 
who are mere matter, must likewise 
behave in a completely determined 
way.  Inner feelings, motivation, 
reasoning, rational choices, it was 
assumed, were the result of operant 
conditioning, reinforced by factors 
within the environment.
So there was the dilemma.  My Chris-
tian heritage and the wider culture 
had led me to value human thought 
processes and to be mindful of moral 
responsibility but my new discipline 
was teaching me that the human mind 
was merely a by-product of function-
ing matter and that thoughts were 
the result of behaviour rather than 
its cause.  What then was the locus 
of the human mind and what was its 
significance for human behaviour and 
responsibility? 
CONSCIOUSNESS AT 
THE INTERSECTION OF 
SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY AND 
THEOLOGY
Perhaps the most unforgettable words 
that come to scientists from the twen-
tieth century are those of Albert Ein-
stein: ‘God does not play dice with the 
universe’.  Einstein found himself in 
profound disagreement with many of 
his colleagues who held that quantum 
mechanics was incompatible with the 
‘deterministic’ world of Isaac Newton 
and those who followed him.  While 
agreeing with his colleagues that it 
was physically impossible to measure 
simultaneously the position and mo-
mentum of sub-atomic particles, it was 
his view that the experimental results 
obtained by his colleagues did not 
justify abandoning the view that every 
event has a cause. Einstein suggested 
that in the counter intuitive world 
of quantum mechanics the notion of 
cause and effect should be extended 
to include the idea that some effects 
may not be definitively linked to their 
causes.  In every branch of science, we 
continue to look for cause and effect 
relationships that can be understood in 
terms of consistent natural law.
It is not surprising then that the major-
ity of scientists assume that the study 
of human consciousness and mind can 
be best pursued by taking on board the 
metaphysical assumption of causal 
determinism, that is, that all events 
including mental events are caused 
by and hence determined by previous 
events. Causal determinism then is an 
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reality and is therefore a philosophical 
orientation that guides almost all sci-
entific endeavour.  Causal determinism 
however does not relate comfortably 
to the study of mind and consciousness 
for two major reasons.  
The first of these relates to the over-
whelming sense of freedom to make 
choices that humans enjoy.  Except 
in the case of mental illness or other 
mitigating circumstances, humans feel 
free to make any decision they choose. 
This perspective is assumed without 
question in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, a 1948 United Na-
tions General Assembly proclamation, 
in which the very first sentence of the 
preamble talks of the inherent dignity 
of all members of the human family 
as the foundation principle support-
ing their right to freedom.  Articles 
18, 19, 20 and 23 for example speak 
of freedom of thought, conscience, 
religion, opinion, freedom of peaceful 
assembly and choice of employment. 
Each of these freedoms appears to fly 
in the face of causal determinism.  It 
is no wonder that Skinner, the shining 
light of behaviourism was provoked 
into writing his best-selling paperback, 
Beyond Freedom and Dignity, in 
which he argued that entrenched belief 
in free will and moral autonomy was 
a hindrance to the use of his proposed 
scientific approach for building a hap-
pier and better organised society. 
Causal determinism also has theologi-
cal implications.  Christians believe 
that they have fundamental responsi-
bilities to both their neighbours and 
to their Creator.  However,  tension 
arises as to how they can simultane-
ously believe that they are able to 
choose to meet their responsibilities 
to God and their neighbour and at the 
same time accept that their behaviour 
is determined at a level over  which 
they ultimately have no influence. 
It is beyond the scope of this short 
paper to address the tension between 
human freedom and causal determin-
ism.   Barbour, in his award-winning 
text, Religion and Science (1997 pages 
312 and following), outlines how a 
number of Christian researchers have 
dealt with this issue.
The second major difficulty in ac-
counting for human consciousness 
in terms of physical, chemical or 
electrical causes within the brain is 
the qualitative gulf between such 
causal mechanisms and the mental 
phenomena for which they are sup-
posed to be responsible.  There seems 
to be an unbridgeable chasm between 
the physics of brain circuits and the 
experience of subjective reality.  It 
is this unbridgeable chasm that has 
come to be known in the literature as 
‘the hard question’ (Chalmers, 1995).
A popular but controversial approach 
to the study of consciousness is that 
advocated by Julian Jaynes (1976) in 
which he sidesteps the hard question 
by defining consciousness much more 
narrowly than as commonly under-
stood.  For Jaynes consciousness is 
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example, during the human experience 
of learning, thinking, or reasoning as 
each of these processes may occur at 
times without conscious attention. 
For Jaynes, consciousness is created 
through the metaphorical use of lan-
guage thus allowing for the spatialisa-
tion of time and the visualization of 
past and future events.
Jaynes’ account of the origin of 
consciousness has failed to attract a 
wide following among the academic 
community.
ORIGIN OF THE TERM – 
‘THE HARD QUESTION’
Many ideas for scientific research 
originate in a unique and improbable 
way and the story of the study of 
consciousness as distinct from cogni-
tive science is no exception.  Stuart 
Hameroff, a collaborator with Roger 
Penrose in consciousness theory, tells 
the story in the following words:
It was there in Tucson 1 - the first 
Tucson conference - in 1994.  It 
was the first ever international 
interdisciplinary conference on 
consciousness and we had it all 
planned out.  The first day was 
philosophy, the second day was 
neuroscience, the third day was 
cognitive science, and so on.
On the first day a very well known, 
famous philosopher spoke first and 
he gave a very boring talk, the 
second speaker was kind of dull, 
and so I was getting worried – like 
the playwright’s opening night, 
you know - that this was gonna 
flop.  Then the third speaker was 
an unknown young philosopher 
named David Chalmers, who 
got up there with hair down to 
his waist, in a T-shirt and jeans, 
and gave the best talk I’d ever 
heard on the topic of conscious-
ness.  He talked about the easy 
problems of consciousness (which 
include reporting, perception, and 
things like that) and then the hard 
problem of conscious experience, 
which is ‘what it’s like to be’… or 
raw sensations.
After, there was a coffee break 
and I went out among the peo-
ple, as one of the organizers of 
the conference, listening in like 
a playwright on opening night. 
And people were just buzzing 
about Dave’s talk and the ‘hard 
problem’, as he called it.  I think 
that moment really galvanized 
an international movement in 
consciousness, because the prob-
lem was identified.  From then 
on we knew what distinguished 
this field from cognitive science 
and other fields that deal with 
how the brain works.  They (i.e. 
cognitive science, neuroscience 
etc.) don’t attempt to grasp the 
difficult problem of consciousness 
itself” (Susan Blackmore 2005, 
pp.115−116).
So what is the ‘hard question’ (Chal-
mers 1995)? It is simply this; how do 
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somehow work together to give us the 
richness of experience of conscious 
mind? Douglas Hofstadter directs our 
attention to this question by asking 
a series of currently unanswerable 
questions:
What is the nature of human 
thought in general?  Is what goes 
on inside our heads just a deter-
ministic physical process?  If so, 
are we, no matter how idiosyn-
cratic and sparkly, nothing but 
slaves to rigid laws governing the 
invisible particles out of which our 
brains are built?  Could creativity 
ever emerge from a set of rigid 
rules governing miniscule objects 
or patterns of numbers?  Could 
a rule-governed machine be as 
creative as a human…?  Could a 
machine make its own decisions? 
Have its own opinions?  Be con-
fused?  Know it was confused?  Be 
unsure whether it was confused? 
Believe it had free will?  Believe 
it didn’t have free will?  Be con-
scious?  Doubt it was conscious? 
Have a self, a soul, an “I”?  Be-
lieve that its fervent belief in its 
“I” was only an illusion, but an 
unavoidable illusion? (Hofstadter 
2007, p.110).
Our experience of the world around 
us is so compelling that few of us 
pause to reflect on how this sense of 
reality is achieved.  Sense receptors 
located in the eye, ear, mouth, nose 
and throughout our bodies respond to 
various physical forces and chemical 
substances in our environment and 
convert these external stimuli into 
neural impulses of varying rates of 
firing and intensity. The brain pro-
cesses these data and then converts 
the ‘booming buzzing confusion’ of 
our eternally dark, silent and odour-
less world into the brilliant world that 
we all experience.  We should pause 
to remember here that each person’s 
unique past experience stored as 
memory within the brain modifies 
incoming sensory data so that each 
person’s view of the world is in some 
respects unique.  While the scientific 
community has developed a range of 
objective measures to describe the 
physical energies that surround us, get-
ting a handle on the subjective reality 
of first- person experience is proving 
to be much more difficult. 
The hard question then concerns the 
relationship that exists between the 
objective reality of the world around 
us and the subjective reality of human 
experience.  The study of this aspect 
of consciousness lies on the fringes of 
science because of necessity its data 
involve a first-person perspective, in 
contrast to the public third-person data 
of traditional science. 
We should not underestimate, how-
ever, the tremendous advances in the 
understanding of consciousness since 
the time of Skinner.  Serious attempts 
have been made over recent years to 
bring the study of consciousness firm-
ly into the scientific fold as evidenced, 
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9for example, by the fact that annual 
conferences of the Association for 
the Scientific Study of Consciousness 
have been conducted since 1997. The 
domain of human consciousness also 
continues to be also of vital concern 
within the disciplines of philosophy 
and theology. 
VARIOUS APPROACHES TO 
CONSCIOUSNESS 
Scientists in general assume a ma-
terialist point of view in which they 
implicitly assume that only that which 
is physical and thus measurable is real. 
The subjective realm of the mind and 
its accompanying mental processes 
are directly associated with their 
accompanying biological states and 
processes.  With some notable excep-
tions scientists spend their energies 
endeavouring to unravel the physical 
processes of the brain and leave the 
philosophers and theologians to argue 
about the more subjective elements 
of consciousness.  Some of the better 
known philosophical positions which 
are defended in the current literature 
are summarised below.  The positions 
presented are not intended to provide 
an exhaustive survey of the details 
of each theory but rather to illustrate 
something of the range of positions 
held and the difficulty of achieving 
consensus.
1.  Classical Dualism – 
Consciousness a Non-material 
Entity
Dualists have a view of the nature of 
reality in which mind and matter are of 
different essence and in which mental 
phenomena are in some respects non-
physical.  This view of reality can be 
traced from Hindu philosophy (c.650 
BCE), the Greek philosophers Plato 
and Aristotle and church scholars in-
cluding Augustine.  Perhaps the best 
known version of dualism comes to us 
from Rene Descartes (1596 – 1650) 
who clearly identified the mind with 
consciousness and self-awareness and 
distinguished this from the brain. 
 Descartes was a scholar of giant intel-
lect who made substantial contribu-
tions not only to philosophy but also 
to physics, mathematics, astronomy 
and physiology.  He also held a degree 
in law.  His major failing is said to 
be his habit of reading, writing and 
thinking in bed until noon.  Cutting 
through time honoured philosophical 
approaches to thinking about nature he 
is honoured as the first modern thinker 
to provide a philosophical framework 
for the natural sciences as they began 
to develop.  As a devoted Catholic 
believer it was natural for him to think 
in terms of body and soul.  For him 
the brain-and-body functioned like a 
steerable machine following the laws 
of physics, with the soul acting as 
pilot.  On the other hand the mind (or 
soul), as a non-material entity, was not 
subject to the laws of physics.  There 
was reciprocal action between mind 
and body at the pineal gland.  He 
was thus the first to clarify what has 
later come to be called the mind-body 
problem – that is, the way in which a 
nonmaterial mind could possibly influ-
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ence a material body.
Dualist views are not commonly held 
today and indeed have not been widely 
accepted for some time.  One notable 
exception, however, was Sir John Ec-
cles.  There is no question that until 
his death in 1997 he was regarded 
as one of the world’s most eminent 
electrophysiologists.  He was profes-
sor of physiology at the Australian 
National University from 1952 – 1966 
and was jointly awarded the Nobel 
Prize in Medicine or Physiology for 
his research on the biophysical proper-
ties of synaptic transmission. Eccles’ 
perspective is nicely summarised by 
Gliedman, in his article, “Scientists 
in search of the Soul”:
. . . Eccles strongly defends the 
ancient religious belief that human 
beings consist of a mysterious 
compound of physical and intan-
gible spirit… Our nonmaterial 
self controls the “liaison brain” 
the way a driver steers a car or a 
programmer directs a computer. 
Man’s ghostly spiritual pres-
ence, says Eccles, exerts just the 
whisper of a physical influence on 
the computer-like brain, enough 
to encourage some neurons to 
fire and others to remain silent. 
Boldly advancing what for most 
scientists is the greatest heresy 
of all, Eccles also asserts that our 
nonmaterial self survives the death 
of the physical brain (Gliedman 
1982, p.105).
2.  Panpsychism - Consciousness is 
a Property of All Matter
Those who adopt panpsychism as a 
philosophical orientation hold that 
consciousness exists, everywhere, at 
all times and in every material thing. 
According to this view, “. . . there is 
a proto-consciousness in all matter, 
even in elementary particles.  Accord-
ing to panpsychism, the evolutionary 
development of the brain is associ-
ated merely with an amplification and 
refinement of what was already there 
as a property of all matter.  It merely 
is exhibited more effectively in the 
complex organizations of the brains of 
higher animals” (Eccles & Robinson 
1984, p.14).
Panpsychism finds a home in the 
philosopher’s realm of metaphysics 
but does not find any place in the 
scientist’s domain of physics. 
3.  Epiphenomenalism - 
Consciousness Irrelevant
According to this view the mind is a 
passive reflection, a trivial by-product, 
a mere side effect of brain activity. 
The whistle of a steam locomotive, 
the chime of a clock or the babbling 
of water do not affect the progress of 
the train, the time of day or the flow of 
the brook; rather they are passive re-
flections of their activity.  Just so, it is 
asserted, conscious mental events are a 
passive reflection of physical changes 
within the nervous system but these 
same mental events are incapable of 
causing any physical changes.
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Even if the notion that mental events 
are merely epiphenomena were true, 
it leaves unexplained what most needs 
explaining:  Why should particular 
physical changes in our nervous 
systems cause feelings and thoughts? 
Even epiphenomena need to be ac-
counted for. 
4.  Radical Materialism - 
Consciousness Does Not Exist
There is a small but vocal group of phi-
losophers that parade under the title of 
‘the radical materialists’. Perhaps the 
most influential philosopher of science 
holding this position is Daniel Den-
nett who wrote in his 1991 volume, 
Consciousness Explained, “In short, 
the mind is the brain.  According to 
the materialists, we can (in principle) 
account for every mental phenomenon 
using the same physical principles, 
laws and raw materials that suffice 
to explain radioactivity, continental 
drift, photosynthesis, reproduction, 
nutrition and growth.  It is one of the 
main burdens of this book to explain 
consciousness without ever giving 
in to the siren song of dualism . . .” 
(Dennett 1991, p.33).
From this perspective, “there is a de-
nial or repudiation of the existence of 
mental events.  They are simply illu-
sory.” (Eccles 1992, pp.17–18).  While 
many reviewers interpret Dennett as 
denying that consciousness exists at all 
(for example Trefil 1997, pp.182–184) 
Andrew Brown (1999, pp.153−154) 
gives a more charitable account: “The 
heart of Dennett’s position seems to be 
that consciousness itself is a mislead-
ing category, and that the only way to 
make sense of it is to redefine all one’s 
terms in terms of externally visible 
states and behaviours”. 
While remaining true to science’s 
doctrine of seeking explanations 
only within the natural world, radical 
materialists are forced into the uncom-
fortable position of having to deny the 
overwhelming importance of their 
own experience of subjective reality, 
as well as insisting that ultimately 
human responsibility, a basic assump-
tion of the world’s legal systems and 
Christianity’s most fundamental as-
sumption, is an illusion.
5.  Physicalism - allows for 
conscious experience
Physicalism as a philosophical orienta-
tion has grown out of the materialist 
position and in keeping with its origins 
asserts that everything that exists is 
no more extensive than its physical 
properties.  The term physicalism 
however, has come to be preferred 
over materialism by scientists of more 
recent times because it incorporates 
such non-material concepts for ex-
ample as wave/particle relationships 
and the non-material forces produced 
by particles.  It is also favoured by 
some Christian scholars because it 
avoids the atheistic connotations of 
materialism. The earliest versions of 
physicalism were reductionist and in 
many respects mirrored the views of 
the radical materialists, which reduce 
mental states and processes to physical 
8




Almost the entire scientific community 
has adopted a physicalist orientation. 
Its value can be appreciated by observ-
ing the exponential advances in our 
understanding across all of the major 
disciplines.  The physicalist approach 
is decidedly weak however when it 
comes to the explanation of qualia - the 
experiences of subjective reality.  The 
hard question for physicalists is how to 
account for subjective experiences in 
an otherwise entirely physical world, 
such as perceiving the redness of an 
apple, appreciating the sounds of a 
symphony, or experiencing the pain 
of a bee sting.
6.  Emergent Materialism – 
Consciousness, a Higher Order 
Feature of the Brain
Emergent materialism as a perspective 
on consciousness crystallised late in 
the twentieth century. Emergence is 
a property of a system that occurs 
when that system exhibits properties 
that are greater than the sum of its 
parts.  According to Roger Sperry 
emergence occurs when two or more 
entities, (sub-atomic particles, atoms 
or molecules) create a new entity 
(consciousness) with new laws and 
properties that were formerly non-
existent.  Even though consciousness 
is generated by neural activity and 
is fully dependent upon such activ-
ity it is none-the-less quite separate 
from it.  Conscious mental states are 
thus created by complex information 
processing within the brain and out of 
that complexity, a new property, con-
sciousness, emerges at a higher level. 
There are divided opinions within this 
community about whether individuals 
can ultimately be held responsible 
for their actions.  Some, such as phi-
losopher John Searle, hold emergentist 
views that leave no room for moral 
action.  For him conscious thoughts, 
like the rest of nature, are determined 
at the basic micro-level of physics (Re-
ichenbach & Anderson 1984, p.93).
On the other hand in Nobel laureate 
Roger Sperry’s brand of emergent 
materialism, consciousness and other 
mental phenomena are products of 
the dynamic living brain in action. 
Once these emergent mental proper-
ties appear, they have causal control 
potency over the ‘lower’ activities of 
the brain at the sub-nuclear, nuclear 
and molecular levels. For Sperry, mind 
emerges from brain, then takes charge 
as chief or director in the complex 
chain of command within the brain 
(see Voneida 1998).  In Sperry’s 
view, there is no need to appeal to 
any source outside the living brain 
in order to explain the origin and 
existence of mental phenomena (see 
Cousins 1985, pp.66−67).  This posi-
tion accommodates the capacity for 
inner purpose and moral action as 
well as the multitude of other complex 
thoughts and behaviours that make us 
uniquely human. 
Roger Sperry’s perspective is attrac-
tive to those who do not accept the tra-
ditional dualist perspective but wish to 
9
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retain a belief in moral responsibility 
and purposive behaviour. The major 
weakness of this position, like that of 
other positions discussed earlier, is 
that it merely reflects the bias of the 
proponent.  Eccles puts the situation 
this way: “. . . (N)owhere in the laws 
of physics or in the laws of the deriva-
tive sciences, chemistry and biology, 
is there any reference to conscious-
ness or mind . . . its emergence is not 
reconcilable with the natural laws as 
at present understood” (Eccles 1992, 
pp,19−20). 
The approaches to the study of con-
sciousness outlined above represent 
some of the more important models 
that can be selected from more than 
three hundred scattered throughout 
the literature.   While not exhaustive 
in either scope or treatment, the ap-
proaches covered give some idea of 
the varying orientations toward the 
mind-body problem. 
VIEWS OF CHRISTIAN 
SCHOLARS
There have been some worthwhile 
contributions to an understanding of 
the mind brain problem that come to 
us from Christian scholars who do 
not hold to the dualistic body-soul 
dichotomy. I will conclude this paper 
by briefly discussing the contribution 
of two such Christian writers.  The 
first contribution comes from Donald 
MacKay who at the time of writing 
(1984) held the post of Professor of 
Communication and Neurosciences, 
University of Keele, England.  It was 
his view that while ”(n)obody can 
rule out on scientific grounds the idea 
that some events in the human brain 
may violate the physical principles 
that apply in other parts of the natural 
world … it would be both unneces-
sary and dangerously misleading for 
Christians to try to defend any such 
theory in the interests of the doctrine 
of man” (MacKay 1984, p.43).  It is 
his view that scientists have not only 
the privilege but also the duty to apply 
their mind to an understanding of the 
brain as part of the natural world as an 
expression of reverence for its Creator 
and as part of the scientific enterprise 
that accomplishes so much that is posi-
tive in human society.
MacKay believes that humans can be 
both free and exercise moral respon-
sibility while at the same time having 
a body, including the brain, that is 
subject to the laws that govern the 
rest of nature.  He argues that just as 
a computer operates at more than one 
level, so also does the human brain. 
This approach appears to place him 
close to the emergent materialist camp. 
When a mathematician describes 
his computer as ‘solving an equa-
tion’, he means that the behaviour 
of the machine is determined (note 
the term) by the particular equa-
tion.   This does not imply that 
there are ‘gaps’ in the physical 
chain-mesh of cause-and-effect 
linking its components, through 
which some invisible entity called 
an ‘equation’ exerts quasi-physical 
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influences on the transistors.  In-
deed the electronic engineer in 
charge of the machine will insist 
that every physical event in it is 
determined (note: the same word) 
by other physical events in its 
depths.  Far from contradicting 
this, the mathematician will insist 
that he relies on its being true as 
the basis for his own claim, that 
the behaviour of the machine as 
a whole was determined by the 
equation!  He will insist equally 
strongly that computer hardware 
and mathematical equations are 
distinct concepts, in quite differ-
ent categories . . . A computing 
machine is simply one example 
of a situation that needs explana-
tions at more than one level in 
order to do it justice.  Each level 
may specify in its own concepts 
what determines the behaviour 
at that level without necessarily 
conflicting with the claims of the 
other.  No matter how complete the 
electronic engineer’s explanation, 
the mathematician’s is necessary, 
and not merely an optional extra, 
if we are not to miss the whole 
point of what a computer is and 
does.  The equation determines 
what the network of transistors 
do, not by prodding them with 
quasi-physical ‘forces’, but by 
being embedded in it.
The point of this illustration is not 
of course to argue that computers 
have minds, still less that men 
(sic) are ‘nothing but’ computers. 
Its purpose is only to suggest an 
alternative way of doing justice 
to biblical data and to common 
experience, by regarding ‘body’, 
‘mind’ and ‘spirit’ as entities rec-
ognizable at three different levels 
of significance of our mysteri-
ous and complex human nature, 
rather than three different kinds of 
‘stuff’ that have somehow to exert 
forces on one another.  According 
to this view, which I like to call 
‘comprehensive realism’, mental 
activity determines brain activity 
by being embedded in it.  Spiritual 
life similarly shapes mental life by 
being embedded in it.  . . . (T)his 
way of thinking about man, as a 
unity with at least three levels of 
significance, is if anything more 
harmonious with biblical empha-
sis than the Cartesian . . . model 
(MacKay 1984, pp. 46−47).
The second contribution of a Christian 
perspective is that of Charles Talia-
ferro, at the time of writing, Professor 
of Philosophy at St Olaf College, Min-
nesota.  He notes that: 
Christians have differed in their 
account of when there is a soul or 
ensoulment (for consciousness). 
Some hold that God creates each 
person or soul directly, others 
(such as myself) hold that the 
emergence of consciousness is the 
outcome of God’s comprehensive 
creative will.  That is, I hold that 
when you came into being, this 
was indeed a divine creation, but 
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rather than being a special divine 
act (like a miracle) it is God’s 
comprehensive will that when 
there is a level of physical com-
plexity and coherence, then there 
emerges consciousness (Taliaferro 
2005, p.193).  
In answer to the question raised earlier 
in his discussion, ”What if future sci-
ence were able to produce conscious-
ness from non-conscious causes?”, 
Charles Taliaferro replies, “If God has 
made the cosmos such that conscious-
ness emerges when certain physical 
conditions obtain, then presumably 
this emergence would take place if 
or when scientists re-create the very 
same physical conditions” (Taliaferro 
2005, p.194). 
CONCLUSION
No clear progress has been made 
toward solving the mysteries of ‘the 
hard question’. Just how our brains 
construct the world as we perceive it 
and how we as individuals are able to 
direct the mental operations associ-
ated with the complexities of living, 
remains a mystery.  To suggest that 
our experience of subjective reality 
and other complex mental  constructs 
emerge at higher levels of brain func-
tioning holds some promise of a useful 
way forward.  The major difficulty 
with this approach, however, is that 
its central thesis is untested and may 
in fact be untestable.
While Christians may do their science 
within a physicalist framework they do 
not live their whole lives within that 
worldview. Attributes such as rational 
thought, creativity and moral choice 
suggest that humans possess capacities 
that transcend that which is merely 
physical.  Belief in a freely acting, 
intelligent Creator makes it simpler 
for them to accept that they share in a 
limited way some of the non-physical 
attributes they ascribe to their Creator. 
QUESTIONS
1. How would you define 
consciousness?
2. What relationship do you 
see between the “soul” and 
consciousness?
3. How would you answer 
Dennett’s assertion that the mind 
equates with the brain?
4. Have you ever wondered what 
actually happens between a 
thought being generated and a 
muscle moving, thus producing 
some physical consequence?  
How do our thoughts become 
reality, or influence reality?
5. How do you react to 
Sperry’s concept of emergent 
mental properties, such as 
consciousness, having “causal 
control potency” over the lower 
activities of the brain?
REFERENCES
Blackmore, S. (2005). Conversa-
tions on Consciousness. New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Brown, A. (1999). The Darwin Wars. 
London: Simon and Schuster.
12
Christian Spirituality and Science, Vol. 9 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://research.avondale.edu.au/css/vol9/iss1/1
16
Barbour, I.G. (1997). Religion and 
Science. New York: Harper and 
Collins.
Chalmers, D.J. (1995). Facing up 
to the problem of consciousness. 
Journal of Consciousness Studies. 
2(3), 200-219.
Cousins, N. (1985). Commentary. In 
Nobel Prize Conversations. Dallas 
TX: Saybrook.
Eccles, J.C. (1992). The Human 
Psyche. London: Routledge.
Eccles, J.C. and Robinson, D.N. 
(1984). The Wonder of being Hu-
man: Our Brain and Our Mind. New 
York: The Free Press.
Gliedman, J. (1982). “Scientists in 
search of the soul,” Science Digest, 
July. 90(7), 77–79, 105.
Glynn, I. (1999). An Anatomy of 
Thought: The Origin and Machin-
ery of the Mind. New York: Oxford 
University Press.
Hofstadter, D. (2007). I Am a 
Strange Loop. New York: Basic 
Books.
Jaynes, J. (1976). The Origin of Con-
sciousness in the Breakdown of the 
Bicameral Mind. Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin.
MacKay, D.M. (1984). Brain sci-
ence and human responsibility. In 
Behavioural Sciences: a Christian 
Perspective. Leicester: Inter-Varsity 
Press.
Reichenbach, B. and Anderson V.E. 
(1995). On Behalf of God. Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.
Sperry, R. (Dec, 1987/Jan, 1988). 
New mindset on consciousness. 
Sunrise. 
Trefil, J. (1997). 101 Things You 
Don’t Know About Science and No 
One Else Does Either. New York: 
John Wiley.
Voneida, T.J. (1998). Sperry’s con-
cept of mind as an emergent property 
of brain function and its implication 
for the future of humankind. Neu-
ropsychologica 36(10), 1077-1082.
Taliaferro, C. (2005). ‘Where Do 
Thoughts Come From?’ in Westa-
cott, M. and Ashton, J.F. (eds), 
The Big Argument. Sydney: Strand 
publishing.
13
Hughes: Subjective Reality: "The Hard Question"
Published by ResearchOnline@Avondale, 2013
